Controlling stockholders routinely retain key governance rights through a stockholder agreement, negotiated at arms-length. Such rights require a company’s board of directors to obtain the stockholder’s approval on significant decisions. A number of cases have been filed challenging the validity of these kinds of approval rights, but the court in Moelis was the first to reject them.
In Moelis, the stockholder agreement under scrutiny gave Moelis: (i) pre-approval rights that required the board to obtain Moelis’ approval for 18 actions, including the incurrence of debt in excess of certain thresholds, the issuance of preferred stock, the entry into new lines of business, the removal or appointment of certain officers, and the amending of governance documents; (ii) board composition rights, including the right to approve any enlargement of the board of directors; and (iii) committee representation rights, including the right to appoint a number of Moelis director designees to each committee of the board equal to the number of Moelis director designees on the full board.
Section 141(a) of the DGCL provides, however, that “the business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.” The court scrutinized the tension between the market practice of private ordering and the legislative mandate in Section 141 and fashioned a two-step inquiry for evaluating whether a contractual provision trumps a board’s ability to manage the corporation consistent with the DGCL.
The court must first consider whether the challenged provision involves an “internal governance arrangement.” The court set out several factors relevant to that consideration, including whether the provision: (i) has a statutory grounding in the DGCL, (ii) is agreed upon by intra-corporate actors; (iii) attempts to delineate how intra-corporate actors “exercise corporate power”; (iv) has a “commercial purpose” beyond governance; (v) has a more legal or equitable remedy for breach; and (vi) has an indefinite duration and/or is difficult for the corporation to terminate.
If, on balance, the provision does not involve an internal governance arrangement, no further evaluation is needed. If the provision does implicate an internal governance arrangement, however, then courts should apply the Abercrombie framework to determine whether the challenged provision “has the effect of removing from the directors in a very substantial way their duty to use their own best judgment on management matters” or “tends to limit in a substantial way the freedom of director decisions on matters of management policy.”
The court evaluated the provisions Moelis had negotiated and concluded that they were “prototypical governance provisions in a prototypical governance agreement.” It next evaluated the provisions under the Abercrombie framework and concluded that a number of Moelis’ pre-approval rights were invalid because they interfered with the board’s ability to use its own judgment to manage the corporation in contravention of Section 141(a). The court noted that the pre-approval requirements were so restrictive that they effectively “render the Board an advisory body.”
Nonetheless, the court upheld other provisions, finding that they did not restrict the board’s discretion, including Moelis’s right to designate directors for a majority of the board seats; right to nominate director designees for election to the board; and the right to have the company use reasonable efforts to cause his designees to be elected to the board.
The rationale of the Moelis case will likely apply to stockholder agreements for public and private Delaware corporations, and board members and stockholders should take note. The Moelis decision will encourage and embolden stockholders to challenge stockholder agreement provisions that grant other stockholders governance rights.
While the court suggested that some restrictions on board action may be permissible if included in a company’s certificate of incorporation—or by issuance of a “golden share”—the court also observed that restrictions on board action must comply with the DGCL. Consequently, structuring alternatives, such as using preferred stock to achieve Moelis¬-style provisions in a stockholder agreement should be carefully scrutinized as they may implicate other governance and fiduciary duty considerations.
Author:

John J. Scharkey

